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Abstract—Using Mobile Ad Hoc Networks as a way to break
the  dependency  of  mobile  communications  on  permanent
infrastructure  has  been an active  area  of  research for  several
years, but only more recently has consideration been given to the
economics  of  a  distributed  mobile  service.   In  particular,  the
topic of handling nodes that act selfishly or maliciously has not
yet  been  explored  in  detail.   In  this  paper,  we  discuss  the
SAVMAN strategy for mobile offloading under the rules of the
2013 MANIAC Challenge.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This work developed from the perceived need to introduce
a  credit-based  approach  to  Mobile  Ad  Hoc  Networks
(MANETs) [2].  A credit based system is one in which either a
source  or  destination  node  must  pay  some  sort  of  virtual
currency  to  send  or  receive  a  packet,  which  is  somehow
distributed amongst  the intermediate  nodes for  their  service.
Such  an  approach  is  intended  to  combat  the  problem  of
uncooperative nodes, which can typically be divided into three
categories:  selfish,  malicious,  and  erroneous/malfunctioning
[3].  Selfish nodes participate in the network only to send their
own packets, and avoid contributing to the network in order to
save their own resources [4].  Malicious nodes, on the other
hand, are nodes which actively attempt to disrupt a network,
for example by flooding the network with useless packets, or
dropping all packets routed through it in a “black hole” attack
[1].1  Malfunctioning nodes are nodes which cannot participate
in, or which inadvertently disrupt the operation of a MANET,
due to erroneous software or hardware.  The observable effects
of such nodes are not believed to be qualitatively distinct from
those of a malicious node, and we will therefore not consider
them further in this paper [2].
1 Other types of maliciousness, such as actively interfering with
the wireless communications channel, are not discussed here.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  In the
next section, we discuss how the SAVMAN (Selfishness As a
Virtue  in  Mobile  Ad hoc  Networks)  strategy  can maximize
throughput  under  the  credit-based  system  which  forms  the
basis  for  the  2013  MANIAC  Challenge  [5].   Section  III
discusses  the  testing  of  our  strategy  and  emulation  of the
MANIAC Challenge.  Section IV provides a retrospective of
lessons learned during the challenge itself, and in section V, we
present our conclusions.
II. MAXIMIZING A NODE'S BALANCE IN THE MANIAC
CHALLENGE
A. Victory
The MANIAC Challenge2 victory conditions are based on
two criteria:  (a)  the maximum balance above 0,  and (b)  the
highest packet delivery ratio [5].  Since in the most realistic
scenario, a totally selfish node is concerned only with its own
balance,  we will  focus  on criterion  (a).   (Note  that  for  our
purposes, we also do not consider attempting to minimize the
balance of the other nodes, since this is only desirable under
the artificial constraints of the Challenge itself.)
B. Maximizing Total Probabilistic Gain
A node performs two main actions to fulfill  its role as a
forwarding  relay:  acquiring  packets  (by  bidding  on  packets
auctioned  by  adjacent  nodes)  and  forwarding  packets  (by
holding  its  own  auctions).   The  SAVMAN  strategy for
maximizing a node's balance is based on unifying these two
components  –  in  particular,  we  observe  that  the  optimal
strategy for forwarding a packet is inextricably bound to how
we acquired the packet.  Following this line of reasoning, we
derive an equation for total probabilistic gain Gtot as follows:
2 The rules of the 2013 MANIAC Challenge are not given in this
text, since the primary audience for this paper is already familiar
with them.  A full description of the rules can be found in [5].
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Gtot = PbidGbid  , (1)
where  Pbid is the probability of winning a bid, and  Gbid is the
conditional probabilistic gain, which is the node's prediction of
the balance increase it would expect, on average, from packets
identical to the one in question, assuming its bid is successful.
Our goal is to maximize the total probabilistic gain for each
bid.
We further expand Gbid as follows:
Gbid = PforGfor + PendGend
Here, Gfor is the forwarding probabilistic gain, which is the
gain we can expect to achieve from forwarding a packet, and
Gend is the gain we can expect if we are unable to forward a
packet at all.  Pfor and Pend are the probabilities associated with
each outcome.  Gend is trivial to calculate based on the rules of
the challenge; Pfor and Gfor however, are not trivial to calculate
directly  and  independently  from  one  another,  so  we
approximate  the  term  PforGfor as  max(PforiGfori),  where  the
subscript i indicates a value specific to one particular next hop
(the one leading to node i).  Thus, we calculate the probability
of success and the most probable gain on forwarding for each
available node, and take the maximum of that set:
Gbid = max(PforiGfori) + Pend(BU – FU)
We split PforiGfori into its constituent cases as follows:
PforiGfori = (BU - BDi)Psucci + (FD – FU)Pfaili (2)
where  Psucci and  Pfaili are the probabilities of succeeding or
failing, respectively, when forwarding to a particular node i.  F
and  B indicate the value of the fine and the bid, respectively.
Variables subscripted with U are upstream values – that is the
values  given  in  the  advert  on  which  we're  bidding  –  while
variables subscripted with D are the downstream values;  FD is
the fine set by us, and is one of the unknowns we are trying to
determine, while BDi is the amount bid by the downstream node
for our packet, which we must estimate based on that node's
previous behaviour.
Given the above equations, we see that our unknown terms
are either parameters which we set (such as BU, our bid for the
packet,  and  FD,  the  fine  we  set  for  our  own  auction),  or
parameters which we can approximate given specific values for
our  own  budget,  bid  and  fine,  and  the  known history  of  a
previous node.  Thus, the entire equation is a function of three
variables – the amount we bid on the packet, the fine we set on
the packet,  and the  budget  we place  on the packet  –  all  of
which our strategy has the freedom to choose.  In preparation
for finding the set  of optimal parameters,  we will make one
more assumption about this function – that it is unimodal.  That
is, we assume that there are no local maxima or minima aside
from  the  single,  global  maximum.   This  is  admittedly  an
untested and uncertain assertion,  which further  research into
this area would need to investigate in more detail.
C. The Fibonacci Cube
Now that the total probabilistic gain is defined in terms of
our three unknowns, we employ an extension of the Fibonacci
search  algorithm  [6]  in  three  dimensions.   This  algorithm
operates  on  effectively  the  same  principle  as  the
one-dimensional Fibonacci search.  The search area consists of
a rectangular prism, whose bounds are provided at the start,
and  at  each  iteration,  the largest  dimension is  chosen  to  be
reduced.  The effective value given to a particular plane in the
prism is given by the maximum of all  points  in that  plane,
which  is  itself  determined  by  using  a  two-dimensional
Fibonacci  Search  over  the  plane.   Thus,  given  plane-wise
maxima for each dimension, the dimensions of the prism can
be sequentially reduced according to the Fibonacci sequence,
eventually  providing  us  with  a  maximum  over  the  entire
volume.
This,  of  course,  requires  boundaries  for  each  of  the
variables – bid, fine and budget.  Hard boundaries for bid and
fine are specified by the rules of the challenge, and the budget
can be no less than 1.  In order to provide an upper bound on
the  budget,  we  simply  define  an  upper  bound  equal  to  the
budget  of  the  previous  auction,  which  should  cover  most
reasonable cases.
D. Avoiding Uncooperative Nodes
It  is  notable  (though not  surprising)  that  Gfaili cannot  be
positive.  This means that bias towards choosing nodes with a
mimimal  Pfaili is  one  of  this  algorithm's  properties.   Pfaili
represents our approximation of the probability of success for
each possible forwarding node;  thus, our selection procedure
for  packet-forwarding  will  take  into  account  these
probabilities, and tend to avoid uncooperative nodes, once their
unwillingness to forward packets has been established.
E. Predicting the Behaviour of Neighbouring Nodes
As  we've seen in the previous sections,  there are certain
variables  in our function which can only be ascertained  (or
approximated) by attempting to predict the behaviour of other
nodes.   To  this  end,  we  have  created  three  types  of  node
profile, which are of the utmost importance in predicting node
behaviour.  Each node in the network has these three profile
types associated with it, and each profile assists in predicting
that nodes behaviour in one particular aspect of the challenge.
The first type of node profile is the Bidding Profile.  This
profile  assists  in  determining  probable  bids  we  can  expect
from other nodes given a particular auction, thus enabling us
to make competent decisions both as bidders and auctioneers.
This  bidding  profile  is  updated  by  observing  other  nodes'
responses to auctions and correlating that information with the
current topology and the parameters of the auction.
The second type of profile is the Auction Profile.  This is
used  to  determine  which  node  is  likely  to  be  chosen  as  a
winner for a particular auction – for example, a node might
always choose the cheapest bid, or the cheapest bid that has a
chance  of  getting  to  the  destination  within  the  budget,  or
simply a random bid.
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The third, and most important profile type is the Reliability
profile.  This profile observes the success rate of a particular
node under various topological  circumstances,  and uses this
information to select an appropriate next node for forwarding.
Through  these  three  profiles,  the  SAVMAN  strategy  is
able  to  predict  the  behaviour  of  other  nodes  in  order  to
optimize its own behaviour and profit.
For further details about the strategy, the reader is invited
to  view  our  implementation,  which  is  stored  in  the
maniacchallenge/2013 github repository [9].
III. TESTING AND SIMULATIONS
A. The Two Testing Approaches
Validating and improving the theoretical approach before
the  MANIAC  Challenge  was crucial  to  avoid  unforeseen
obstacles.  Two  approaches  were  considered  during  the
preparation for the challenge.  The first approach consisted of a
single-machine  simulation,  whereas  the  second  approach
consisted of a testbed with netbooks functioning as  nodes in
the network.
While  both  approaches  require  multiple  changes  and
adaptations of the MANIAC API, the requirement were set to
minimize the impact  of these changes  in comparison to the
final challenge.
The simulation software, implemented in Java, fulfills this
requirement by allowing the assignment of virtual  devices to
different (local) IP addresses on one machine.  This approach
leaves  the  packet  handling  of  the  API  untouched  and
comparable to the final challenge.  The simulation then creates
virtual backbones which inject packets into the network. 
The Nexus 7 tablets in the challenge were to  be provided
with network information through the olsrd - txtinfo plugin
[7].  To emulate this behavior, a software class provides each
virtual node with a fake network topology.  This topology can
be set up to appear as a multi-hop network and allows each
virtual  node  to  behave  differently  according  to  its  own
strategy.  This software approach also allows the simulation of
lost packets similar to a real network.
Tests with the simulation provided satisfying results with
smaller  networks.  Due  to  timing  constrains  in  the  final
MANIAC Challenge and the increased processing power and
computation  time  which  the  single-machine  simulation
required for larger networks, the second approach provided a
test environment more comparable to the final challenge. 
The  second  approach  emulates  Nexus  7  behavior  in  an
OLSR network.  The open-source project olsrd [8] allows the
creation of an optimized link state network easily, and is the
basis of this approach.  Machines in the network run olsrd and
the  txtinfo  plugin,  as  well  as  an adapted  version  of  the
MANIAC API.  Selected nodes act as backbones and provide
packets  for  the  nodes   to  deliver.   This  approach  includes
realistic  timeouts,  packet  collision  and  network  changes.
After completing the setup, the testbed revealed  the  distinct
advantages and disadvantages of different strategies and node
behavior, and enabled suitable preparation for the challenge.
B. Test-bed Considerations
The Linux based OLSR network of the test-bed consisted of 6
netbooks and 2 Nexus 7 devices, connected over ad-hoc mode
WLAN.  2 of the netbooks were configured to run an emulated
version of the backbone, while the rest of the netbooks were
deployed with the adapted version of  the MANIAC API as
competing  MANIAC  nodes.   The  Nexus  7  devices  were
deployed  with  the  SAVMAN  strategy.   In  this  section,  we
describe  some  of  the  important  aspects  considered  when
building the test-bed.
Multi-hop connectivity: Wireless proximity of the nodes in
the  test-bed  resulted  in  single  hope  OLSR  connectivity
between  all  the  nodes.   To  test  our  strategies  in  a  fairly
realistic manner, we setup Media Access Control (MAC) layer
filtering  on  the  nodes  to  form a  multi-hop  OLSR network
based on the different network topologies that we identified.
The  IPTABLES facility  in  Linux  was  used  to  setup  MAC
filtering.
Topology:  We identified a number of scenarios in which to
test  the  SAVMAN strategy.   Each  of  these  scenarios  was
tested with a particular multi-hop network topology.
Network  Monitoring:  One  of  the  aims  in  testing  the
SAVMAN strategy in the test-bed was to determine how well
it worked against the other nodes in the OLSR network. To
identify the performance of each node in the OLSR network,
we  developed  a  packet  sniffer  application  that  dumped
statistics on  all  auctions, bids, bid wins and the balances of
each of the nodes.  This application used the PCAP facility in
Linux to capture all packets in the OLSR network.
IV. LESSONS LEARNED
One  of  the  crucial  lessons  learned  in  the  MANIAC
Challenge was related to the change in network behaviour due
to  heterogeneous  strategies.   While  any  given  strategy  may
have  worked  well  in  a  controlled  environment,  the  entire
collection of strategies that were employed did not mix well
together.   For  example,  certain  strategies  would  attempt  to
repeatedly undercut one another in the bidding process, leading
to  extremely  low  bidding  prices  and  subsequent auction
budgets,  which  could  lead  to adjacent  nodes  simply  not
bothering to forward the packet.
A related point of interest was a modification made by the
Brazilian team to their  strategy – their observation was that
certain teams were putting out auctions with a budget of 1, and
their nodes were then winning these packets and forwarding
them  directly  to  the  destination.   Of  course  the  selfish
behaviour of setting the auction budget to 1 is harmful to the
network  in  general,  despite  being  a  potentially  effective
strategy.   Therefore  the  Brazilian  team  chose  to  make  a
modification  to  their  strategy  in  subsequent  rounds  which
would attempt to acquire and drop all packets auctioned with a
sufficently low budget.   They found that  after  implementing
this, nodes which had been bidding on packets at a reasonable
price,  then auctioning them off  at  a  very low price  actually
adapted their behaviour and ceased giving them packets for a
price  of  1.   However,  this  only  increased  the  problem  of
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cost-undercutting mentioned above,  by creating a black hole
for all packets acquired by low-bidding nodes.
V. CONCLUSION
Mobile  Ad  Hoc  Networks  (MANETS)  rely  strongly  on
cooperation  between  nodes  due  to  their  distributed  nature,
which naturally makes them highly vulnerable to the effects of
selfish  and  malicious  nodes.   This  can  be  controlled  by  a
credit-based system, but only to the extent that the system itself
does not open further opportunities for exploitation.
In this paper, we have seen how the MANIAC framework
permits a node to act  entirely in its  own interest,  while still
contributing  positively  to  the  package  delivery  rate  of  the
MANET.  We have also described the SAVMAN strategy for
mobile  offloading,  which  is  based  on  maximizing  a
mathematical  function  whose  parameters  are  determined  by
carefully observing the behaviour of other nodes, and we have
further  described  how this strategy was tested by creating a
simulation of the MANIAC Challenge and pitting our strategy
agains some artificial opponents.  Lastly, we have provided a
retrospective  of  the  challenge  itself,  containing  observations
and lessons learned which we hope will be useful for future
research in this area.
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